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A Response to Professor Graham
Professor Graham's comments are on-point in many respects. However, I must recognize that we have a fundamental disagreement regarding the efficacy of jury instructions and other alternative devices as
opposed to wholesale admission of the expert testimony in question.
Fundamentally, it seems as if we are not in accord on the proper application of Daubert. Professor Graham seems to favor the broadest possible
spectrum of admissibility, at least in this regard. As discussed at great
length in my Comment, I believe that the judiciary should not abrogate
its gate-keeping function in favor of unlimited testimony of experts.
I am in complete agreement with Professor Graham that there are a
myriad of factors that could tend to undermine eyewitness identifications. I would even agree that at least some of these factors are beyond
the ken of the average juror. However, these same statements could be
made regarding any number of factors that would be presented at trial.
This does not make them fair game for expert testimony, if there are
reasonably effective alternatives available. Without rehashing the arguments made at great length in my Comment, I firmly believe that there
are any number of such alternatives available, which would more than
adequately inform the jury of the factors affecting the credibility of eyewitnesses without the dangers presented by expert testimony. Specifically, these other methods avoid both the unnecessary loss of judicial
economy and the aura of infallibilty that surrounds the expert.
Upon presentation of this Comment, it was suggested that the
founding fathers would prefer to let five guilty men go free than convict
one innocent individual. Besides the questionable reliance on original
intent, I would suggest that the founders did not suggest this their preferential model.' If it is possible to tweak the system so that no innocent
people are convicted, while the -guilty are given their just deserts, this
would seem to be the best possible system. Limiting the questioned
testimony to situations in which the Moon factors are present, as outlined in the body of the Comment, would best serve the needs of original
intent and the modem judicial system. Wholesale admissibility simply
would not.
THOMAS DILLICKRATH

1. It is interesting that many of those who invoke original intent and formalist analysis in
this context would be the first in line to criticize Justice Scalia in his invocation of this method of
analysis in other circumstances.
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